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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine hypothesised links between the board of directors and firm performance as 
predicted by the three predominant theories in corporate governance research, namely agency 
theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory.  By employing a pattern matching 
analysis of seven cases, we are able to examine the hypothesised link between board demography 
and firm performance expected under each theory.  We find that while each theory can explain a 
particular case, no single theory explains the general pattern of results.  We conclude by 
endorsing recent calls for a more process-orientated approach to both theory and empirical 
analysis, if we are to understand how boards add value. 
 
  
Do boards of directors really have any impact on corporate performance?  This 
question is central to the normative assumption that boards should both contribute to, and 
be held accountable for, firm performance (Drucker, 1999; NACD, 2000).  The belief that 
directors do have an impact on firm performance is reflected in survey research, which 
indicates institutional investors are willing to pay a premium for “good governance” 
(Felton, Hudnut and van Heeckeren, 1996: 170; Investor Relations Business, 2000: 1).  
This assumption is reflected at virtually all levels of the global business system.  
Institutional investors worldwide expect boards to contribute to firm performance (Black, 
1992; Useem 1993), there are repeated calls to overhaul national systems of corporate 
governance and make boards more accountable, particularly in developing nations 
(Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman, 2000), and there is widespread public criticism of 
particular boards (Lavelle, 2002) and even of individual directors (Chernoff, 2000). 
There has also been an escalation of research interest in corporate governance and the 
relationship between the board and firm performance over the past fifteen years (e.g. Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989; Pettigrew, 1992; Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 
1999).  Given the importance of the subject and the level of research activity, it would seem 
reasonable to expect that a clear and demonstrable link between the board and corporate 
performance has been established.  Despite a sustained effort, however, researchers have so 
far failed to identify this link. 
The majority of academic research into the board-performance nexus has adopted 
Pfeffer’s (1983) argument that demographic variables provide parsimonious and objective 
representations of constructs that are otherwise difficult to collect and validate.  As a result, 
the research agenda has concentrated on large-sample, quantitative studies directly 
examining the relationship between corporate performance and various board attributes such 
  
as board independence (Bhagat and Black, 1999), leadership structure (Fosberg and Nelson, 
1999), board size (Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells, 1998), and the role of the CEO 
(Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Sanders, 2001).  In general, these studies report either small 
(but conflicting) results or no demonstrable link.  Lawrence and Stapledon (1999), for 
example, found only scattered non-robust correlations between various performance 
measures and the proportion of independent directors, while Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
found no correlation between board composition and firm performance.  Recent summary 
meta-analytic studies have not aided in clarifying these relationships, with Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, and Johnson, (1998) finding no relationship between board composition and 
financial performance, while Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy (2000) found a small 
positive relationship.   
In a related research stream, academics have examined the relationship between board 
attributes (such as independence) and various corporate activities thought to impact on 
shareholder wealth.  Results are similar to those examining the direct board-performance 
relationship, producing equivocal findings (Westphal, 1999).  For example, studies analysing the 
relationship between board structure and various activities such as corporate diversification (Hill 
and Snell, 1988; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990), CEO compensation (Fosberg, 1999), the use of 
long-term incentive plans (Zajac and Westphal, 1994), the adoption of takeover defences such as 
poison pills (Brickley, Coles and Terry, 1994; Coles and Hesterly, 2000) or paying of green mail 
(Kosnik, 1987), and the commission of illegal acts (Kesner, Victor and Lamont, 1986) have 
produced negative findings, or been unable to identify any correlation at all.  In short, there is a 
long line of research that provides little consensus as to the effect of the board of directors on the 
performance of the corporation both directly or through corporate activities thought to affect 
shareholder wealth (Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Coles, McWilliams and Sen, 2001). 
  
More recently, research efforts aimed at examining the processes by which boards carry out 
their roles, rather than impacts on corporate behaviour or performance directly, have met with 
more promising results.  For instance, Westphal (1999) reported that social ties between the 
board and CEO typically enhanced the likelihood of independent directors providing advice and 
counsel to the CEO.  In studies with colleagues he also reported that a board’s engagement in the 
strategic decision-making process encourages interlocking directorates (Gulati and Westphal, 
1999) and that the strategic context of social network ties between directors, rather than number 
of interlocks, is an important influence on corporate governance (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). 
In studies investigating the board’s involvement in strategy, Golden and Zajac (2001) found 
that, in the governance of hospitals, board processes and demography significantly affect 
strategic change.  Similarly, Westphal and Fredrickson (2001) found that, while the prior 
experience of new CEOs predicts corporate strategic change, this might mask the process by 
which an experienced board can influence strategy development. 
A third board role relates to a director providing access to resources such as information 
(Baysinger and Zardhoohi, 1986).  When investigating a board’s access to information, 
Haunschild and Beckman (1998) found the process by which boards gain information about 
acquisitions varies according to whether the information is derived from a personal or impersonal 
source.   
While these studies contribute significantly to our understanding of how board attributes 
contribute to board roles, none of them has as yet attempted to link board attributes with 
corporate performance.  By reviewing both the traditional board-performance and more recent 
board-behaviour studies it becomes apparent that it is necessary to understand the processes that 
link the board of directors to corporate performance, rather than looking for a parsimonious 
relationship, (such as simple correlation) between the two (Pettigrew, 1992; Forbes and Milliken 
  
1999).  Our objective, therefore, is to build upon the recent literature and attempt to unravel the 
processes that link board attributes to firm performance and in so doing make two contributions 
to the research agenda.  First, we aim to examine the entire process predicted to link boards to 
corporate performance by investigating the three theoretical paradigms that dominate corporate 
governance research, namely agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Eisenhardt, 1989a), stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 1994) 
and resource dependence theory (Zald, 1969; Pfeffer, 1972; 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
Second, our methodology allows us to move beyond traditional samples that have concentrated 
on the top tiers of the for-profit business community and respond to Forbes and Milliken’s (1999) 
call for a greater understanding of the differences between the boards of for-profit companies and 
boards that work under different ownership structures.  In short, we aim to employ a qualitative 
methodology to shed new light onto the entire board-performance nexus across a variety of 
corporate structures.   
THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PATTERN DEVELOPMENT 
Agency theory, stewardship and resource dependence theories have undoubtedly assisted us 
to understand the role that directors may play in contributing to the performance of the 
organisations they govern.  The operationalisation of these theories, however, has tended to focus 
on specific demographic variables in isolation making “inferential leaps…from input variables 
such as board composition to output variables such as board performance” (Pettigrew, 1992: 
171).  Agency theorists, for example, concentrate on the link(s) between board independence or 
leadership structure and various operationalisations of firm performance (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Conversely, stewardship theory focuses on the proportion of 
insiders on the board to investigate links with corporate performance (Donaldson, 1990; 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  Finally, resource dependence theory analyses the relationship 
  
between director interlocks and various aspects of firm performance or behaviour (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). 
The difficulty with empirical tests of the prevailing theories that focus on specific input and 
output variables is that they fail to engage the “superior explanatory power of studies that 
incorporate the study of process constructs” (Forbes and Milliken, 1999: 490).  Therefore, a first 
step in addressing this limitation is to identify the processes predicted by the three predominant 
corporate governance theories, instead of “ignoring away the messy concepts and the soft issues, 
of studying the outcomes but not the processes, and of nomothetically treating firms as black 
boxes” (Parkhe, 1993: 246).  Our objective in the following three sections is to draw on the key 
concepts of each theory to develop an expected pattern of data to compare against our fieldwork.  
Agency Theory  
Agency theory is concerned with aligning the interests of owners and managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Stano, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) and is based on the premise 
that there is an inherent conflict between the interests of a firm’s owners and its management 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983).  The recognition of this conflict is documented as far back as Adam 
Smith (1776), but its salience was not realised until the expansion of capitalism in the late 1800s 
and early 1900s led to a widespread separation of the ownership and control functions of the firm 
(Berle and Means, 1932).  This meant that managers now possessed superior knowledge and 
expertise to the firm’s owners and were therefore in a position to pursue self-interested action at 
the expense of shareholders.  Jensen and Meckling (1976), who argued that agency costs are an 
inevitable part of the management/ownership relationship, formalised this hypothesis into a 
mathematical model. 
The agency dilemma has been elaborated in a string of key articles (e.g. Fama, 1980; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989a), which identify that management self-interest can be 
  
detected in clear and tangible benefits such as perquisites (large offices, flying first class, etc.) 
and in less easily identified motivations such as the pursuit of growth at the expense of profit 
(Stano, 1976).  The clear implication for corporate governance is that adequate monitoring 
mechanisms need to be established to protect shareholders from management’s conflict of 
interest – the so-called “agency costs” of modern capitalism (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
The impact of agency theory on corporate governance research can be observed in the 
predominance of studies that examine two key questions, namely, how the composition of boards 
of directors affects firm performance (e.g. Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998; Wagner, Stimpert and 
Fubara, 1998) and how the leadership structure of the company (i.e., the duality of the 
CEO/chairman role) affects corporate performance (e.g. Dalton et al., 1998).  As previously 
outlined, the findings from these studies have been contradictory.  Studies of outsider ratios and 
firm performance, for example, have produced findings ranging from positive correlations 
(Pearce and Zahra, 1992), to negative (Beatty and Zajac, 1994), to no significant correlation at all 
(Buchholz and Ribbens, 1994).  In summary, extensive research in the area has shown any 
relationship between composition and/or leadership structure and firm performance to be 
“inconsistent and conflicting” (Rhoades et al., 2000: 77).  Moreover, as research interest has 
increased, there has been “a growing diversity of results” (Kakabadse et al., 2001: 24). 
As to the mechanism by which a board is expected to impact on corporate performance, 
agency theory suggests that a greater proportion of outside/independent directors - recognising 
that these two terms are not identical - will be able to monitor any self-interested actions by 
managers.  As a result of the monitoring, there will be less opportunity for managers to pursue 
self-interest at the expense of owners (lower agency costs) and so shareholders will enjoy greater 
returns (or increased profits).  The agency model is widely accepted in the business community, 
as can be seen by the widespread adoption of normative guidelines emphasising the need for 
  
independent directors to monitor the activities of the board (Bosch, 1995; NACD, 1996).  If 
agency theory holds, therefore, we would expect to find the following patterns: 
Pattern 1(a): High levels of outsiders on the board are associated with high 
monitoring of management, which is associated with low agency costs and 
consequently high corporate performance. 
Alternatively, agency theory suggests that if management interests dominate the 
board, there will be little opportunity for monitoring of their activities.  As a result, we 
would expect there to be a link between the reduced monitoring and a rise in agency 
costs.  These agency costs (both direct perquisites and indirect agency costs such as 
unprofitable growth) would result in reduced corporate profits.  Hence, we would also 
anticipate finding that: 
Pattern 1(b):  Low levels of outsiders on the board are associated with low 
monitoring of management, which is associated with high agency costs and 
low corporate performance. 
Stewardship Theory 
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory posits that managers are essentially 
trustworthy individuals and so are good stewards of the resources entrusted to them (Donaldson, 
1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 1994).  Since inside (or executive) directors spend their 
working lives in the company they govern, they understand the businesses better than outside 
directors and so can make superior decisions (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 
1994).  As a result, proponents of stewardship theory contend that superior corporate 
performance will be linked to a majority of inside directors as they naturally work to maximise 
profit for shareholders.  In the well-known language of motivation (McGregor, 1960), 
stewardship theory plays a “Theory Y” view of managers to agency’s “Theory X” perspective, 
  
arguing that an overemphasis on monitoring is unnecessary for the board to impact on corporate 
performance. 
Stewardship theory is based on two premises; namely, that managers are naturally 
trustworthy (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Preston, 1995) and/or that agency costs will be 
minimised as a matter of course, as senior executives are unlikely to disadvantage shareholders 
for fear of jeopardising their reputations (Donaldson and Davis, 1994).  Further, even if agency 
costs are a significant concern to a company and monitoring is necessary, stewardship theorists 
also hypothesise that outside or independent directors will lack the knowledge, time and 
resources to monitor management effectively (Donaldson and Davis, 1994).   
As with agency theory, however, there is no clear empirical evidence to support any claim 
that a preponderance of inside directors provides superior corporate performance.  Since 
stewardship theory is a mirror of agency theory, it is worth reiterating that the overwhelming 
evidence both from individual studies (e.g. Kesner et al., 1986; Daily and Dalton, 1992a; 1992b; 
1993;) and meta analyses (Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999; 
Rhoades et al., 2000) fails to establish any clear relationship between board composition and/or 
leadership structure and corporate performance or behaviours. 
The processes that link the board of directors to superior firm performance are not made 
explicit in the stewardship literature, although making superior decisions (that in turn positively 
affect corporate performance) is regarded as a key issue (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990).  
Access to information and the ability to take a long-term view are seen as key aspects of the 
decision-making process (Donaldson and Davis, 1994).  For example, studies have examined the 
superior amount and quality of information possessed by inside directors (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990), the apparent relationship between investing in the long-term (R&D spending) 
and inside directors (Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk, 1991) and a more balanced approach to CEO 
  
compensation taken by inside directors (Boyd, 1994).  The implication from these findings is 
that, because inside directors know the company intimately, they have superior access to 
information and are therefore able to make more informed decisions.  If stewardship theory 
holds, we would expect to find that: 
Pattern 2(a): High levels of inside directorships are associated with high access 
to information, which leads to high quality decision making and, consequently, 
high corporate performance. 
Alternatively, we would expect that if there were few inside directors on the board, the 
board would not be in a position to fully understand the company.  It would only have access to 
information provided by management and would lack the contextual nature to make more 
informed decisions. Similarly, outside directors would not have the same access to informal 
knowledge sources within the firm.  As a result, decisions made by a board dominated by 
outsiders would be of a lower quality and this would in turn lead to low firm performance.  
Therefore, we would expect the following pattern: 
Pattern 2(b): Low levels of inside directorships are associated with low access to 
information, which leads to poor quality decision making and, consequently, poor 
corporate performance. 
Resource Dependence Theory 
The third major theory of corporate governance is that of resource dependence, which 
maintains that the board is an essential link between the firm and the essential resources that it 
needs to maximise performance (Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Since resource 
dependence theory draws from both the sociology and management disciplines (Pettigrew, 1992), 
there is no universally accepted definition of what is an important resource.  Sociologists have 
tended to concentrate on three distinct types of links, namely the links that a board provides to a 
  
nation’s business elite (Useem, 1984), access to capital (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988; Stearns and 
Mizruchi, 1993) or links to competitors (Mizruchi, 1992; 1996).  In each instance, the researchers 
make credible arguments that the resource in question is a key determinant of success. 
Management scholars have tended to take a more generic approach, following the resource-
based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984).  Researchers such as Hillman, 
Canella, and Paetzold, (2000) and Palmer and Barber (2001) view the board as a potentially 
important resource for the corporation, especially in its links with the external environment.  In 
major reviews of the board-performance literature, the ability of the board to link into significant 
resources is seen as one of its key roles (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Korac-Kakabadse, Kakabadse 
and Kourim, 2001). 
While the board’s ability to access key resources is seen as important, the exact nature of 
the resources is variable.  The value of a particular resource is seen as contextual, depending on 
the urgency of the need.  Specific resources that have been studied because of their perceived 
value to the firm include information (Baysinger and Zardkoohi, 1986), finance or capital (Burt, 
1983; Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988), links to key suppliers (Banerji and Sambharya, 1996), 
customers (Frooman, 1999) and other significant stakeholders (Freeman and Evan, 1990). 
Despite the fact that the value of a specific resource will change with the context of the 
firm, there is a clear theoretical argument that a board with a high level of links to the external 
environment will provide a company with a high level of access to various resources, including 
those listed above.  Thus, if resource dependence theory holds, we would expect to find the 
following related patterns: 
Pattern 3(a):  A high level of links to the external environment is associated 
with high access to resources and, consequently, high corporate performance. 
  
Alternatively, we would expect that if a board has few links to the external environment, 
the firm’s access to key resources would be severely limited.  This would in turn result in low 
corporate performance and so we would expect to find the following pattern: 
Pattern 3(b):  A low level of links to the external environment is associated with 
low access to resources, and consequently, low corporate performance. 
The three processes by which boards are expected to impact on corporate performance as 
predicted by each theory of corporate governance are provided in figure 1. 
 
Insert figure 1 about here 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Matching the methodology to the research question is central to any research effort (Punch, 
1998; May, 1997).  We employed a case-based methodology for two reasons.  First, the 
phenomenon linking boards of directors to corporate performance (if it exists) is not well 
understood.  As the preceding theoretical development outlined, the majority of research has 
concentrated on the input-output link as opposed to the entire process by which a board may 
impact on corporate performance (Pettigrew, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999).  Second, to test 
the three different theories of corporate governance, the study required investigation of a 
significant number of variables across the hypothesised models.  In short, the nature of the 
models (complex and evolving) and the objective of the study (understanding a process) called 
for a methodology that could analyse rich data within specific contexts.  This made an in-depth 
case study methodology a natural choice (Yin, 1993; 1994).   
In particular, we followed Yin (1994) and Eisenhardt (1989b) to build an explanatory case 
study methodology.  Rather than following a traditional grounded theory approach to theory 
  
building (see Glasser and Strauss, 1967), we started with the definition of a research question and 
broad models for investigation (Eisenhardt, 1989b).  Such an approach follows Mintzberg’s 
(1979: 585) advice to always begin with a “well-defined focus – to collect specific kinds of data 
systematically”.  The models initially defined our focus and led to the patterns that we have 
outlined in the previous section.  This approach allowed shaping of the data collection protocols 
and selection of cases to reflect the models under investigation (Yin, 1994). 
Sample 
The aim of this study was to elucidate the board of directors-firm performance link rather 
than to quantify the level of value added.  Accordingly, we were prepared to trade case breadth 
for depth (Patton, 1987) and employed purposive or theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989b; 
Yin, 1989; Patton, 1990).  Despite selection of a limited number of cases, it was possible to 
replicate outcomes across cases in the study and simultaneously extend theoretical insight 
through extreme situations or polar types (Pettigrew, 1990).  In particular, the combination of 
cases allowed for literal replication of key case features (e.g. insider-dominated boards versus 
outsider-dominated boards), as well as theoretical replication of case context (e.g. traditional for-
profit motives versus not-for-profit motives, listed versus unlisted companies) across a range of 
industries (e.g. manufacturing, health services, construction). 
An overview of the cases selected is contained in table 1, along with a summary of the 
sampling logic for each case.  A key and deliberate strategy we employed with our sampling was 
to attempt to test various frameworks across a range of organisational types in Australia.  Thus, in 
line with one of our key research aims and in contrast to many empirical corporate governance 
studies, the sample was not restricted to for-profit organisations. 
 
Insert table 1 about here 
  
 
Data Collection 
Data collection procedures followed a three-phase process.  First, after initial discussions 
with each organisation, interviews with directors and other key personnel were conducted.  All 
interviews followed a semi-structured process, steered by an interview guide designed to prompt 
the interviewers to probe on the variables of interest to the study (Lofland, 1971).  To encourage 
full and frank disclosure, interviews were not tape-recorded (Yin, 1994), but instead handwritten 
notes were kept of individual responses.  The interview guide for each subsequent case was 
updated with theoretical issues or themes that emerged in earlier cases. 
Semi-structured interviews were used to maximise the flexibility of the interview and allow 
tailoring of each interview to the individual (Lofland, 1971; Yin, 1994).  To minimise potential 
bias in interrogation and interpretation, two researchers conducted each interview (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  After each interview, the two researchers compared notes and agreed the 
themes that were discussed.  
As the interviews proceeded, the second stage of data collection took place.  Each 
organisation was asked to supply the researchers with a number of key documents which 
included the last two annual reports of the organisation, the last three sets of board papers 
(including agenda, board minutes and special items of interest to the board) and any other 
significant documentation identified in the interviews.  Other sources of documentary evidence 
were also consulted at this stage, including newspaper articles, trade publications, academic 
journals, competitor reports and industry statistics. 
The third stage of data collection overlapped the initial data analysis in order to allow 
empirical evidence to progressively inform the testing of theory (Eisenhardt, 1989b).  The 
archival, documentary and interview data from stages one and two were analysed and presented 
  
to the board of each organisation to ensure that construct validity had been achieved (Yin, 1994).  
Following Stoecker (1991), this was presented to the boards in the form of a workshop with the 
researchers taking part as participant-observers.  Participant observation has the distinct 
advantage of allowing access to groups and events that would otherwise be inaccessible to the 
researcher (Yin, 1994). 
In all cases, the problem of potential bias was recognised and two researchers were 
assigned to each workshop to ensure independent thinking and recording of observations.  
Further, particular attention was taken that advocacy did not extend to bias.  Thus we were able to 
follow our “moral obligation to focus enough of our attention on the case to inform those who are 
living it”, while not confusing “advocacy with bias” (Stoecker, 1991: 100).  In addition to 
providing added insight into the data collected, the workshop ensured that construct validity was 
achieved, as each board was walked through the research findings and given ample room to 
clarify and amend the data presented.   
Analysis 
Since we were interested in finding an association between boards and organisational 
performance, the unit of analysis selected was the board of each organisation rather than 
individual directors (Beverland, 2000).  The methodological choice of presenting the findings to 
each board meant that extensive case notes were prepared on each organisation in the study.  This 
extensive intra-case analysis often ran to over 50 pages and provided sufficient material for a full- 
day workshop.   
Each case report discussed the key elements of the organisation’s board that were thought 
to impact on overall corporate performance.  The purpose of the workshops was to gain 
consensus from each board on essential elements of their corporate governance process and detail 
  
the actions they thought appropriate to improve corporate performance through changes at the 
board level. 
To overcome possible bias resulting from the researchers’ involvement in board 
interactions, the data were initially provided to coders who had not been involved in the interview 
or workshop processes.  The coders were provided with a classification system that allowed them 
to identify the broad models under investigation within the case data.  They were instructed to 
compare the case data supplied against each of the six patterns under investigation.   
In order to carry out a cross-case analysis, we employed a pattern-matching logic (Trochim, 
1989) that involves comparing the case-based empirical patterns with several alternative 
theoretical patterns (Yin, 1994) (see also Campbell’s (1975) theory comparison method).  Thus 
we established patterns for the three major theories of corporate governance, namely agency 
theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory as detailed earlier.  We then 
compared our coded empirical findings with these patterns to establish whether existing theories 
of corporate governance adequately explained the cases we studied.  Rather than allowing one 
theory “to win” (Stoecker, 1991: 101), we concentrated on noting the extent to which each 
theoretical perspective represented the empirical process.   
Variables 
The use of pattern matching means that there may be no quantitative or statistical criteria 
on which to judge the pattern.  This can result in interpretive discretion on the part of the 
researcher.  Taking this into account, we followed Yin’s (1994) advice, and did not postulate 
subtle patterns, but rather concentrated on case studies likely to lead to “gross matches or 
mismatches and in which even an ‘eyeballing’ technique is sufficiently convincing to draw a 
conclusion” (Yin, 1994: 110).  We also limited classification of each variable to high, medium or 
low in this process. 
  
Testing of the patterns required the operationalisation of ten variables.  We used well-
established operationalisations such as percentage of board outsiders, percentage of independent 
directors, percentage of board insiders and ROA (Dalton et al., 1998) wherever possible.  We 
have based our assessment of a director’s independence on the Australian Stock Exchange’s 
criteria, which include that the director is not a not a substantial shareholder of the company or an 
officer of a substantial shareholder of the company, has not been employed in an executive 
capacity by the company or another group member, or been a director after ceasing to hold any 
such employment within the last three years (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003: 20).    
In some cases, we needed to use several different data points to operationalise a variable.  
For instance, in the case of corporate performance we triangulated firm financial performance 
with participant views of corporate performance.  This was particularly important because of the 
differing motivation of the companies we studied, since a standard measure of financial 
performance would not, in isolation, be a valid measure of performance (for instance, in a not-
for-profit organisation).  As discussed previously, the other six variables, namely monitoring, 
agency costs, access to information, quality of decisions, links with environment and access to 
resources were defined and coded by the research assistants and researchers.  Data were then 
matched to each of these variables using Miles and Huberman’s (1994) tabular approach.   
RESULTS 
To facilitate the interpretation of the data, each of the following tables presents an overview 
of the expected data patterns for each theory, a summary of the observed pattern for each case 
(along with examples of the evidence for each rating) and a generalised conclusion as to whether 
the case “matched” the pattern based on the data.  A potential confound of the data in case two 
occurred when, during the data collection period, the CEO was replaced.  Even though data were 
collected over a two-month period, we were in interested a cross-sectional analysis of the 
  
patterns, not their evolution over time.  Therefore, to disentangle this effect the data were 
analysed for both the first and second CEO.  Hence, case two has two sets of results.  
Agency theory patterns.  Agency theory argues for a preponderance of outside directors to 
control for management misuse of shareholder funds (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  These 
outside directors are expected to monitor management actions (Fama and Jensen, 1983) to curtail 
a growth focus (at the expense of firm profitability) and reduce management perquisites (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Stano, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983).   
A first point to note is that in using a more stringent test of director independence such as 
that of the ASX Corporate Governance Council (2003), rather than the less strict outside director 
categorisation, the director classification variable changes markedly for four of the seven cases.  
Indeed three of the companies have a high proportion of outside directors and only a low 
proportion of independent directors.  A fourth company had a high proportion of outside 
directors, but only a medium proportion of independent directors. 
As table 2A shows, only two of the cases we studied followed a predicted agency theory 
pattern.  Case four had a pattern of an insider-dominated board leading to a lack of monitoring 
and increased agency costs with poor performance.  In contrast, outsiders dominated all other 
boards.  Of these organisations, case six followed the predicted pattern 1A.  While not recorded 
in the summary tables, there were significant proportions of owners or owner nominees sitting on 
the boards in cases two, three, five and seven and an owner representative sat on the board of 
case one.  In cases one and two, we found significant evidence of agency costs and a general lack 
of monitoring even though a preponderance of outsiders sat on these boards. This was an 
unanticipated result, especially as these organisations were responsible for budgets in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars.   
 
  
Insert table 2A about here 
 
Cases two, three and five demonstrate partial matches.  Case two demonstrated that agency 
costs could decline with a different management team, irrespective of the monitoring of the 
board.  In this case the same board presided over two management teams, each with different 
levels of agency costs.  In case three, the company in question was under significant financial 
stress during the study.  This case demonstrated that in the absence of fraud, a lack of resources 
due to poor performance is likely to provide little scope for agency costs to develop, irrespective 
of the board’s monitoring.  Case five showed that, even with reasonable monitoring of the 
organisation, agency costs could develop.  In particular, in this case the board perceived that there 
were intangible agency costs.  The key intangible in case five related to a perceived deficiency in 
the work ethic displayed by senior management, which could not reasonably be monitored.   
 
Insert table 2B about here 
 
In contrast, when the stricter definition of independence is used for board composition, 
three of the organisations conform to the patterns predicted by agency theory as shown in Table 
2B.  Cases four and six had the same classification of the board composition under both the 
outside and independence criteria.  However, case one, while having a high proportion of outside 
directors, had only a low proportion of independent directors.  With this change in board 
classification the case changes from no match to a match with pattern 1b – low independence 
associated with low monitoring, high agency costs and low performance.  The situation in case 
two also changes, as agency theory now provides a partial explanation of performance prior to 
the CEO change, but does not present an explanation after the CEO change. 
  
Table 2C provides a summary of the agency theory findings using both the definitions of 
outside and independent directors.  A first observation is that there can be a decided difference in 
the classification of board composition depending on whether the definition of outsider or 
independent is used.  For case three, this difference in definition is extreme, all the board are 
outsiders, but none is independent.  In case two the change is almost as dramatic.  A second 
observation is that this change in definition can lead to different conclusions, in some cases, 
concerning the prevalence of agency effects.  For case one, the low proportion of independents, 
as distinct from outsiders, offers an explanation as to why the high agency costs and low 
performance may have occurred, as several of the directors had had a long-term and high 
emotional involvement with the organisation, leading them to identify strongly with 
management’s plans for growth and diversification.  In summary, agency theory does appear to 
provide a partial explanation, in some circumstances, of the board-performance link. 
 
Insert table 2C about here 
 
Stewardship theory patterns.  From a stewardship perspective, we would expect to see 
significantly different patterns emerge.  More particularly, we would expect to see that a high 
proportion of inside directors would lead to greater access to information, superior decision 
making and therefore higher firm performance (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991).   
As table 3 reveals, only two cases we examined conformed to the expected patterns.  
Importantly, the insider-dominated board (case 4) did follow a segment of the pattern (high 
insider-proportion and high access to information), but this did not translate into quality decision 
making and improved corporate performance.  In point of fact, this organisation was the worst 
performing of the seven cases. 
  
With the two exceptions (cases one and seven), there was no linkage between a low level of 
inside directors and low access to information in any case.  Highlighting this point, in case two 
the same board was confronted with improved levels of information after a change in the senior 
management of the organisation.  This did appear to have a positive impact on the quality of 
decisions that the board made and consequent performance of the company, leading to a partial 
match with one of the anticipated patterns.  It is, however, hard to disentangle (in this case) the 
relationship between board decisions and corporate performance given that there was a 
simultaneous change in management (i.e., we cannot disentangle the impact of the change of 
management on performance as opposed to the effect of board decisions on performance).  
Interestingly, the change in management highlighted that stewardship theory’s proposed linkage 
between insiders on the board and access to information is not necessarily an essential 
relationship because, although no more insiders were appointed to the board, the information 
flow improved markedly. 
In case five, there was a partial match since the board appeared to have good access to 
information, made quality decisions, and there was a resulting high level of corporate 
performance.  This pattern matched three of the four predicted variable linkages.  However, it 
appeared to run against the stewardship argument that there is necessarily a need for a large 
proportion of insiders on the board to ensure access to information, quality of decisions, and 
corporate performance and so could only be considered a partial match. 
 
Insert table 3 about here 
 
For cases one and seven, which record a match to pattern 2b and consequently support the 
patter predicted by stewardship theory, it is difficult, given the information uncovered in the case 
research, to support the claim that high access to information, quality decision making and 
  
subsequent strong performance would have occurred had there been a greater number of insiders 
on the board.  As noted above, both organisations, while high on outside directors were moderate 
to low on independent directors.  In both cases several of the outside directors had long and in-
depth experience with the organisations, approaching the level of understanding expected of 
inside directors.  However, this knowledge base and a high level of involvement were not 
sufficient to provide either access to information or quality of decision making to improve 
performance in the short term.  In short, it appears that stewardship theory, like agency theory, 
offers us a partial glimpse of the board-performance relationship rather than a complete picture of 
the board-performance nexus. 
Resource dependence theory patterns.  The final theory for pattern matching analysis is 
that of resource dependence, which proposes that the board plays a crucial role in linking the 
organisation to necessary resources (Zald, 1969; Pfeffer, 1972; 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
Thus, it is expected that boards that have significant links to fundamentally important 
constituencies and/or resources will contribute significantly to firm performance (Zald, 1969; 
Pfeffer, 1972; 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).   
As table 4 highlights, the test of the resource dependence patterns revealed no consistency 
across the cases.  There was no match in cases one, two, four, five and six, while the only match 
to a pattern was provided by case three where directors had few external linkages, provided very 
little (if any) resources to the company and the organisation was under considerable financial 
strain.  Interestingly, case five, while not strong enough to provide a pattern match, did show 
several links to two key stakeholder groups.  Although these could not be considered high-level 
linkages, those that did exist provided access to information that assisted that organisation to 
perform well.   
  
Case seven provides a partial match to pattern 3a, which associates low links with the 
environment and low access to resources with poor performance.  Five of the eight directors are 
farmers who have strong links with other farmer suppliers.  However, they have few links with 
either the general environment or key customers.  Fieldwork established that much of the 
attention of the organisation had been focused on farmer supplier issues, to the detriment of more 
general business issues, which in turn was one cause of the organisation’s low performance.  This 
could be argued to be a situation where some links to the environment had lead to a misdirection 
of governance and corporate effort, while a lack of other links had lead to the outcomes predicted 
by resource dependence theory. 
A key limitation to this particular analysis is that the research team needed to conceptualise 
the key resources of each case for classification purposes, leading to concern over potential bias.  
However, both researchers and coders agreed the final classification system, thus minimising the 
chance of bias.  Further, as indicated earlier, participants reviewed the results to improve 
construct validity.  
 
Insert table 4 about here 
 
Synopsis of hypothesised patterns.  Overall the data revealed mixed findings when 
compared to the hypothesised patterns developed from existing theories.  There was no clear 
pattern supporting any one of the predominant theories.  In fact, each of the three competing 
theories resulted in a clear match with at least one of the cases studied.  As indicated in table 5, 
cases four and six exhibited behaviours which we expect from agency theory.  Cases one and 
seven exhibit the pattern expected from stewardship theory.  Similarly, case three revealed a 
pattern consistent with resource dependence theory.  In addition, there were partial pattern 
matches with the theories across the cases.  Interestingly, case two did not appear to match any of 
  
the predominant theories of corporate governance and case five partially matched two of the 
expected patterns. Finally, case one shows patterns which are both consistent with agency theory, 
if using the proportion of independent directors to represent the external focus of the board and 
stewardship theory – a result not unexpected, as one theory is in many respects the obverse of the 
other.  Yet, as shown in cases four and six, the existence of an agency theory pattern does not 
necessarily produce the obverse pattern to support stewardship given the different intervening 
variables expected under the two theories.  In summary, our research indicated that each of the 
three theories that dominate the corporate governance literature held in specific cases, but that 
none of the theories could account for the general pattern of results across all, or even a majority, 
of cases. 
 
Insert table 5 about here 
 
DISCUSSION 
The objective of our research was to extend current understanding of the processes, 
constructs, and relationships linking the board of directors to firm performance.  In particular, we 
wanted to move beyond the conceptual boxes of traditional inquiry (Daft and Lewin, 1996) by 
“reaching into areas of ambiguity … rather than examining relationships among traditional 
variables” (Parkhe, 1993: 229).  This study is intended as a direct response to the calls for a more 
process-oriented approach to governance research (Pettigrew, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
While some patterns predicted by the three theories did emerge, of greater significance 
were the patterns that did not emerge.  In the case of agency theory, for example, our findings 
have failed to identify a positive relationship between a preponderance of outside directors and a 
reduction in agency costs.  For instance, in case two there were clear signs of agency costs, 
particularly under the first management team. Under traditional agency theory, it would be 
  
expected that this would be consistent with strong management representation on the board 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2000).  The facts reveal a diametrically opposite situation.  Of the eight 
board members, all but one were also owners of the firm.  This is a clear indication that a 
preponderance of outside directorships (and even ownership representation) is not a sufficient 
condition to dispel agency costs.  
Another difficulty with empirical tests of agency theory is that they assume a clear and 
observable relationship between agency costs and firm financial performance (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Coles et al., 2001).  As Stano (1976) indicates, agency theory affects the profit 
maximisation motive of a corporation, not necessarily the absolute profit level.  Thus, firms can 
be highly profitable when agency costs are present.  This view is supported by case five where, 
despite being a highly profitable operation, the board considered significant agency costs were 
being incurred.  
The final concern with agency theory is that, by seeking to establish the monitoring of 
management as the central role of the board, it discounts the significant impact of other board 
roles that can improve corporate performance.  Johnson et al. (1996) point out that there are in 
fact three roles of the board, monitoring, access to resources and the service or advising role.  
While many researchers view monitoring as an essential board role (e.g. Zahra and Pearce, 1989; 
Bainbridge, 1993; Daily and Schwenk, 1996), our results indicate that high monitoring alone is 
no guarantee of corporate performance.  By focusing on the monitoring role, agency theory 
appears to discount the impact of other board functions, such as advising management and 
providing access to valuable resources.  Lorsch and MacIver (1989: 64-65), for example, 
highlight that most boards feel their main role is to advise management.  Similarly, Higgins and 
Gulati, (2000) demonstrate that directors may play a major role in providing access to significant 
resources, such as raising capital.  In general, it is evident that agency theory appears to provide 
  
us with a specific narrow element of the board-performance link rather than a holistic view of the 
entire mechanism at work.  
Turning to stewardship theory, we found no clear evidence to support any claim that a 
preponderance of inside directors leads to superior corporate performance.  Although other 
studies have found significant relationships between inside directors and returns to investors 
(Kesner, 1987) and firm performance (Vance, 1978), our research supports the overwhelming 
evidence both from individual studies (e.g. Kesner et al., 1986; Daily and Dalton 1992a; 1992b; 
1993) and meta-analyses (Dalton et al., 1998; 1999) that fail to establish any clear relationship 
between the proportion of inside directors and corporate performance. 
In case four, inside directors dominated the organisation that destroyed the greatest amount 
of shareholder value in absolute terms.  Despite a predominance of inside directors with 
significant access to information, this organisation demonstrated what could only be considered 
poor performance over a five-year period.  Thus, the pattern expected of improved performance 
resulting from high access to information and better decision making was certainly not evident.  
Similarly, in case two, we observed a significant turnaround in the fortunes of the organisation 
with the same board at the helm.  This indicates that, under certain conditions, the interaction 
between the board and management can have a significant impact on performance, with no 
change in board structure and/or composition.    
A key concern with stewardship theory is that it fails to account for those instances where 
managers do not act as good stewards, as demonstrated in cases four and two.  There is ample 
evidence to suggest that managers can and do exploit their position to the detriment of 
shareholders (e.g. Burrough and Helyar, 1990).  Stewardship theory also ignores other benefits 
that outside directors can bring to a firm, in particular, the independent advice that directors can 
offer (Charan, 1998), and the significant role that they can play in facilitating access to much-
  
needed resources (e.g. Mizruchi, 1992; 1996).  It would appear that stewardship theory, like 
agency theory, offers a glimpse of one aspect of the board-performance relationship as opposed 
to a holistic view. 
In the case of resource dependence theory, our results again failed to confirm the expected 
relationship between linkages to the external environment and high firm performance.  Analysis 
of cases two and three reveals that high levels of external links are no guarantee of access to 
resources, even when those links are to people or organisations that could prove advantageous to 
the firm.  Case seven is also of interest as it demonstrates that strong links to one stakeholder 
group by a majority of board members can lead to a loss of focus on other key stakeholder groups 
to the detriment of the organisation. 
Although our evidence is somewhat equivocal, several cases did demonstrate that boards 
view their linkages to the external environment as important.  In case one, both directors and 
management commented on the importance of linkages to the government.  These data were 
triangulated with evidence of the organisation’s activities that included establishing a board level 
task force to improve this aspect of board activity.  Similarly, in case two, directors commented 
on the importance of linkages to suppliers, while directors in case four commented that directors 
with general business linkages could provide the company with improved market prospects.  In 
case three, however, there was no clear evidence of any links that would enable the firm to access 
much-needed resources. 
We contend that, as with agency and stewardship theories, the resource dependence 
perspective concentrates on a single aspect of a board’s role, namely, engaging with the external 
environment to access critical resources.  This view ignores alternative activities of the board 
such as providing advice (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Westphal, 1999), monitoring (Fama, 1980; 
Bainbridge, 1993; Johnson, et al., 1996) and strategising (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Kesner and 
  
Johnson, 1990).  Resource dependence theory focuses on investigating a single segment of the 
corporate governance mechanism to investigate how boards contribute to firm performance. 
Implications for theory 
There are three key theoretical contributions that can be drawn from our research.  First, it 
has confirmed that the process by which a board impacts on firm performance is necessarily a 
complex one (Pettigrew, 1992).  In fact, it appears that the relationship is substantially more 
varied and complex than any single governance theory examined is adequate to describe.  While 
the positive match of all theories to at least one case studied demonstrates that each theory can 
inform our understanding of corporate performance, future model development of board-
performance effects will need to avoid simplistic explanations of the processes involved (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999).  While the links between board inputs (such as board composition and 
director attributes) and board roles were described over twenty years ago (Mace, 1971; Lorsch 
and MacIver, 1989), theories to explain them are only now being developed and investigated 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Westphal, 1999; Golden and Zajac, 2001).  It is arguable that the 
“hard” data sources used so often in past governance research are unlikely to capture the “soft” 
nature of many of these relationships (Parkhe, 1993).  By studying the process variables 
(Pettigrew, 1992) and investigating what boards do, we may develop a more integrative model of 
all of the elements discussed in existing theories (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
Additionally, it may be necessary to examine the contextual nature of board-performance 
links.  If, as Lorsch and MacIver (1989) report, directors are the “firefighters” of an organisation, 
then it is likely that any board effect on firm performance will be highly dependent on context-
specific situations such as stage of organisational life cycle (Johnson, 1997), industry 
homogeneity and regulation (Palia, 2000), competitive conditions (Carpenter and Westphal, 
2001), technology changes (Castanias and Helfat, 2001) and general industry conditions 
  
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996).  Our own research supports the view that different contexts 
have the potential to affect the board-performance link.   
Another consideration that arises from our research is that, as Golden and Zajac (2001) 
highlight, the relationships between the variables themselves may be non-linear.  For instance, 
the pattern hypothesised in stewardship theory calls for a linear relationship between the 
percentage of insiders on the board and the quality of information with which the board is 
confronted.  Instead, it is feasible the relationship may be log-linear, in that there is decreasing 
marginal information benefit to each additional insider serving on the board.  This complexity 
may be confounded in the linkage between information and quality of decisions, particularly if 
there is a groupthink, an effect of having too many inside directors on a board.  Unfortunately, 
our methodology meant that our measures were not sensitive enough to test for these non-linear 
effects.  We would point out, though, that theoretical models must be robust enough to reflect 
both the complexity of the relationship as well as explain the relationships between the different 
variables. 
The second implication for theory involves an effect for which we did not test explicitly, 
namely the mediating or moderating effect of management between the board and corporate 
performance.  Our results suggest that the effectiveness of a management team (and how that 
team interacts with the board) is a fundamental confound in any board-performance relationship.  
For instance, in case two the same board presided over both medium and high corporate 
performance.  The key change that occurred was at the management level.  In particular, 
management introduced new planning and reporting regimes that allowed the board to improve 
its decision making significantly.  In case seven, while organisational performance was low at the 
time of the case study, a new CEO had been appointed approximately 12 months prior to the field 
work.  To some extent, some of the poor performance could be attributed to this new CEO 
  
finding and exposing problems that had been hidden by his predecessor.  This has lead to a “wake 
up call” to the board which, together with the actions of the new CEO, may reverse the poor 
performance. 
While a strong CEO and management team appear to be essential to superior corporate 
performance, Daily and Schwenk (1996) point out that, if the role of the board is to monitor and 
discipline CEOs to ensure that they are acting in the best interests of shareholders, this role may 
be much more difficult to fulfil in situations where managerial discretion is high.  Clearly, the 
relationship between the board and managerial discretion is a vexed one, and remains relatively 
unexplored in the academic literature (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998).  Any corporate governance 
model attempting to link the board to corporate performance will need to explain the role of 
management in the relationship, or alternatively to control for any management effect. 
Finally, an element of our research that was not examined in detail was the measurement of 
firm performance.  The majority of cases we studied considered non-financial outcomes at least 
as important as the financial outcomes.  In case one, for example, fulfilling the organisation’s 
mission was seen as a key indicator of performance.  In case two, member satisfaction was seen 
as critical to the firm’s success and in case five, maintaining close links with government was 
seen as an imperative.  While our data indicated that there is a close association between financial 
and non-financial firm performance, the data also confirmed that the financial and non-financial 
results are not the same, and any misspecification of the dependent variable can have a 
substantial bearing on any future findings.  This point is often neglected in traditional quantitative 
research studies, but given the growing acceptance of multiple-objective frameworks for 
corporate management, such as the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992) and triple 
bottom line reporting (Elkington, 1997), it is something that researchers need to consider. 
  
Implications for Practice 
This study has the potential to challenge normative advice on the practice of good 
governance, particularly in relation to board independence.  The current emphasis on the need for 
independent boards (Boeker, 1992; Zajac and Westphal, 1996) to monitor management may need 
to be tempered in order to reflect the particular circumstances facing an organisation.  Our 
research has established that monitoring of management to reduce agency costs is only one of the 
roles that a board should pursue to improve corporate performance.  The board will also need to 
carry out advising (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Dalton et al., 1999), 
strategising (Tricker, 1984; Black 1992) and access to resources roles (Stearns and Mizruchi, 
1993; Mizruchi and Stearns, 1994).   Board composition that focuses solely on independence may 
lead to a trade-off in these other areas (Westphal, 1999).   
Since there does not appear to be a board function or governance mechanism universally 
applicable to all boards, individual boards need to develop and agree a role set that will contribute 
to the performance of the organisation.  Thus, it is clearly a priority for boards to understand the 
needs of the organisation and then seek to recruit directors based on those needs.  This means 
that, to source appropriate skills, it may be more appropriate to appoint inside directors in some 
circumstances, rather than blindly follow normative advice to recruit outside directors (Turnbull, 
2001). 
Related to the need for a board to match new directors to board requirements is the 
potential confound of board roles due to the firm’s circumstances such as operating environment 
and life cycle stage (Johnson, 1997).  For instance, in a highly regulated industry such as utilities, 
there would most likely be great benefit in boards that could provide access to the politicians who 
control the utility’s operating environment.  It is also likely that as the business operating 
environment and the firm itself evolves, the role emphasis of the board will also vary.  This leads 
  
us to conclude that a board will need to conduct a periodic analysis of its operating environment 
to ensure that it has the right combination of director skills.   
Finally, the board will need to ensure that it is acting to fulfil the wishes of its owners or 
members.  Our research indicates that significant performance deficiencies can occur as a result 
of the board not fully understanding what a company’s owners or members require of it.  A clear 
specification of what constitutes corporate performance is the starting point.  In the case of listed 
for-profit entities, this has been thought of as a relatively simple exercise because business 
profitability is the key issue.  However, the rising interest of investors in ethical investments 
(Mackenzie and Lewis, 1999) indicates that the profit motive is not the only consideration 
guiding the actions of investors.  Many companies are now attuned to these investor concerns, as 
demonstrated by the corporate objectives of firms such as The Body Shop (2002) and Ben and 
Jerry’s (2002). 
In the case of not-for-profit and government-owned corporations, our research has indicated 
the importance of an explicit statement of organisational goals and values if the board is to 
monitor its performance in relation to owner or member expectations.  Performance in not-for-
profit and government-owned corporations can be measured against such goals as fulfilling the 
organisation’s mission, success in mobilising resources and staff effectiveness (Sawhill and 
Williamson, 2001). 
Limitations 
Although this study has advanced our understanding of corporate governance processes, we 
recognise there are several limitations to our approach.  First, while the qualitative methodology 
employed means that the results themselves provide theoretical generalisation (Yin, 1994) (in that 
they are evidence that agency, stewardship and resource dependence theories are not universally 
applicable) and the careful selection of cases ensures replication across many dimensions (e.g. 
  
for-profit motive, outsider dominated boards and high performing/low performing organisations) 
the number of variables under study meant that some dimensions (e.g. insider-dominated boards) 
were not replicated.  Clearly, for these results to be generalisable, a further quantitative test of the 
processes in these theories would be helpful. 
A second area of concern involves the timing of the measurement of the variables under 
study.  A recent study of papers published in the most prestigious management journals reveals 
that the majority of researchers fail to specify the timing expected between cause and effect 
variables (Mitchell and James, 2001).  Our study was more robust than a traditional cross-
sectional analysis and many longitudinal analyses in that the sequence of variables was specified 
as part of the study.  Since the data were collected over a significant period (3-18 months), it 
allowed for the sequence of events to be observed and the relatively short time frame (3-18 
months) meant that potential confounds of the performance effects could be minimised.  We do, 
however, recognise that the study may have benefited from a tighter specification of the time lags 
between the variables.  
We also recognise that our frame of reference was cross-sectional in that we were looking 
for evidence of patterns at a particular moment as opposed to observing the changing levels of the 
variables over time and the relationships between them.  This means our study ignored the 
dynamic nature of the board processes.  For instance, it is arguable that in case two there was a 
rise in agency costs over time under the first manager.  This led to the board replacing the CEO 
and a consequent reduction in agency costs.  This kind of real-world dynamic, as illustrated in 
figure 1, is only possible through the use of longitudinal data, as a snapshot of data will not reveal 
this dynamic relationship. 
Finally, the third key limitation of our study was that the linkage between boards and 
corporate performance may be due to a context that was not taken into account in this study, for 
  
example, organisation type, industry type or lifecycle stage of the firm (Johnson, 1997; Coles, 
McWilliams and Sen, 2001).  Any one of these factors may impact on the applicability of each 
the theories under investigation and would require a more careful elaboration of each theory and 
specification of the expected patterns.  For instance, Higgins and Gulati (2000) highlight the 
importance of the resource dependence perspective to start-up firms.  Currently, however, there is 
little theoretical guidance on these issues. 
Implications for future research 
While it may be possible to extend research along the existing lines of agency, stewardship 
and resource dependence theory, our finding that there is no one universal theory applicable to 
the board-performance relationship indicates that future research into these three models would 
need to concentrate on isolating the conditions necessary for each particular theory to hold.  A 
more productive research agenda may be to develop theoretical models along different, more 
integrative lines if we are to develop a holistic view of the board of directors-firm performance 
link. 
Our research also indicates that understanding the intervening variables that influence the 
board of directors-firm performance relationship is critical to developing a more integrative 
approach.  For example, extending current research beyond the advice-giving role of the board 
(Westphal, 1999) to examine how the relationship between the board and the CEO impacts the 
board-performance relationship would appear to be an important area for investigation.  Another 
important question is whether differences in the human capital of boards are related to differences 
in strategic action and performance (Castanias and Helfat, 2001).  Similarly, is there any impact 
on firm performance if a board exhibits the traits of groupthink?  These and many other questions 
are fertile grounds for enquiry when investigating the board-performance link. 
  
We also join with Pettigrew (1992) and Forbes and Milliken (1999) to encourage research 
activities that will identify, measure and test for board process.  The predominant research 
methodologies have consistently overlooked process issues and it is only by addressing matters of 
process that we can hope to demonstrate the board-performance link.   A new research stream 
may follow the current trend to study large-scale data sources with new and innovative 
methodologies (e.g. Golden and Zajac, 2001), but we would also suggest the use of more 
qualitative data methodologies (Pettigrew, 1992) to investigate board process. 
In conclusion, we believe that this study demonstrates that the case study methodology can 
provide us with richer forms of data and new tools for analysis to shed light on the complex 
processes involved in the board-corporate performance relationship.  We see this study as an 
extension of the quantitative research agenda into the board-performance nexus and one that 
highlights the need to develop a more holistic and complex theory linking the board of directors 
to corporate performance. 
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Figure 1: Processes predicted by three theories of corporate governance and 
associated expected data patterns 
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Table 1:  Summary of cases studied and sampling logic 
 
Case Sizea % Outsiders 
% 
Independent 
Size of 
board Motive Scope 
Owner or 
owner nominee 
on board 
Key sampling 
logic 
1 Medium 90% 30% 10 Not for profit Regional 10% 
• Outsider 
dominated 
• Moderate gray 
directors 
• Not for profit 
2 Large 100% 12.5% 8 For profit National 87.5% 
• Large size 
• Outsider 
dominated 
• For profit 
• High ownership 
representation 
3 Small 100% 0% 4 For profit Regional 50% 
• Small size 
• Outsider 
dominated 
• For profit 
4 Large 25% 12.5% 8 For profit National 25% 
• Large size 
• Low outsiders 
• For profit 
5 Medium 100% 71% 7 
Government 
owned 
corporation 
Regional 43% 
• Government 
owned 
• High outsiders 
6 Large 83% 83% 6 For profit National 0% 
• Large public 
company 
7 Large 88% 50% 8 Co-operative Regional 50% 
• Large size 
• Co-operative 
• Outsiders and 
independents 
 
a  Classification of size was by turnover - small < $50M 
 $50M < medium < $500M 
 $500M < large 
  
  
Table 2A:  Expected and observed data patterns for agency theory with outside directors 
Expected Patterns Proportion Outside Directors Monitoring of Management Evidence of Agency Costs Performance 
Pattern 1a High High Low High 
Pattern 1b Low Low High Low 
 
Outsider %a Monitoringb Agency Costsb Performance Case 
Rating EvidenceRating Evidence Rating Evidence Rating Evidencec,d 
Match 
1 High 90% Low 
• Basic monitoring procedures 
lacking 
• Poor reporting mechanisms 
• Lack of a consolidated asset and 
profit position 
High 
• Diversification of services and facilities 
• High growth focus 
• Access to unmonitored budgets Low 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews 
No match 
High 100% Low • Poor documentation of compliance/ monitoring High 
• Diversification of services, industry, geography under 
previous management Med 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews No match 
2 
High 100% Low 
• Management opinion 
• Poor documentation of 
compliance/ monitoring 
Low 
• Limited level of perquisites 
High 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews Partial match pattern 1a 
3 High 100% Med 
• Heavy monitoring of certain 
activities 
• In depth understanding of business
• Monitoring essential KPIs 
questionable 
Low 
• Limited resources to divert 
• No evidence 
Low 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews Partial match 
pattern 1a 
4 Low 25% Low • In depth financial figures • Little else monitored High 
• Large growth in turnover (loss making) 
• Significant perquisites evident Low 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews 
Match pattern 
1b 
5 High 100% Med • Strong financial controls Low • Distrust of management High • ROA
e 
• Director/mgmt interviews 
Partial match 
pattern 1a 
6 High 83% High 
• Extensive controls 
• Active Risk Committee Low 
• No evidence 
High 
• Outperformed total share 
market 
• Director/mgmt interviews 
Match pattern 
1a 
7 High 88% Low • Poor financial controls Low • No evidence Low • Loss making • Director/mgmt interviews No match 
a Classification based on: Low < 33% 
                                         33% < Medium < 66% 
                                         66% < High 
b Classification based on coding – examples of evidence given  
c Classification for ROA based on: Low < 5% 
                                                      5% < Medium < 12% 
                                                  12% < High  
d In all cases the qualitative assessment of firm performance matched the ROA classification 
e Based on Net cash inflow from operating activities/Total assets because government-owned organisation  
  
Table 2B:  Expected and observed data patterns for agency theory with independent directors 
Expected Patterns Proportion Independent Directors Monitoring of Management Evidence of Agency Costs Performance 
Pattern 1a High High Low High 
Pattern 1b Low Low High Low 
 
Independence 
%a Monitoring
b Agency Costsb Performance Case 
Rating EvidenceRating Evidence Rating Evidence Rating Evidencec,d 
Match 
1 Low 30% Low 
• Basic monitoring procedures 
lacking 
• Poor reporting mechanisms 
• Lack of a consolidated asset and 
profit position 
High 
• Diversification of services and facilities 
• High growth focus 
• Access to unmonitored budgets Low 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews Match pattern 
1b 
Low 12.5% Low • Poor documentation of compliance/ monitoring High 
• Diversification of services, industry, geography under 
previous management Med 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews 
Partial match 
pattern 1b 
2 
Low 12.5% Low 
• Management opinion 
• Poor documentation of 
compliance/ monitoring 
Low 
• Limited level of perquisites 
High 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews No match 
3 Low 0% Med 
• Heavy monitoring of certain 
activities 
• In depth understanding of business
• Monitoring essential KPIs 
questionable 
Low 
• Limited resources to divert 
• No evidence 
Low 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews 
No match 
4 Low 12.5% Low • In depth financial figures • Little else monitored High 
• Large growth in turnover (loss making) 
• Significant perquisites evident Low 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews 
Match pattern 
1b 
5 High 71% Med • Strong financial controls Low • Distrust of management High • ROA
e 
• Director/mgmt interviews 
Partial match 
pattern 1a 
6 High 83% High 
• Extensive controls 
• Active Risk Committee Low 
• No evidence 
High 
• Outperformed total share 
market 
• Director/mgmt interviews 
Match pattern 
1a 
7 Med 50% Low • Poor financial controls Low • No evidence Low • Loss making • Director/mgmt interviews No match 
a-e Classifications as in Table 2A 
 
  
Table 2C:  Match between expected and observed patterns of agency theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: ● – High Match;  - Partial Match; ○ – No Match 
Case Outside Directors Independent Directors 
1 ○ ● 
2 ○/ /○ 
3  ○ 
4 ● ● 
5   
6 ● ● 
7 ○ ○ 
  
Table 3:  Expected and observed data patterns for stewardship theory 
Expected Patterns Proportion Inside Directors Access to Information Quality of Decision Making Performance 
Pattern 2a High High High High 
Pattern 2b Low Low Low Low 
 
a Classification based on: Low < 33% 
                                         33% < Medium < 66% 
                                         66% < High 
b Classification based on coding – examples of evidence given  
c Classification for ROA based on: Low < 5% 
                                                      5% < Medium < 12% 
                                                  12% < High  
d In all cases the qualitative assessment of firm performance matched the ROA classification 
e Based on Net cash inflow from operating activities/Total assets because government-owned organisation  
Insider %a Access to Informationb Quality of Decision Makingb Performance Case 
Rating Evidence Rating Evidence Rating Evidence Rating Evidencec,d 
Match 
1 Low 10% Low 
• Poorly presented board papers 
• Directors uncomfortable with 
information 
Low 
• Decisions  
• Limited time to make decisions 
• Directors see decisions now as poor 
Low 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews Match pattern 2b 
Low 0% Med 
• Well acquainted with industry 
• Some information not passed in timely 
manner 
Low 
• Influenced by management direction 
• Long lead time to question management direction Med 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews No match 
2 
Low 0% High • Well acquainted with industry • Clear and timely supply of information Med 
• Major decisions undertaken with positive results 
• Increased undertaking of strategy role High 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews 
Partial 
match 2a 
3 Low 0% High 
• Well acquainted with business 
• Well acquainted with industry 
• Informal links to information Low 
• Evidence of potential legal concerns about decisions 
• Poor performance 
• Major IT project had significant problems 
• Significant differences with management about how to 
cope with change 
Low 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews 
No match 
4 High 67% High 
• Executives immersed in the work 
• Significant effort in compiling large 
volumes of financial data 
• Ability to access information across all 
organisation 
Low 
• Significant losses for several years 
• Poor processes (e.g. meeting schedules, minutes, 
agenda, etc) to guide decision making process  
• No evidence of analysis or systems to ensure adequate 
decisions 
Low 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews 
No match 
5 Low 0% High 
• Directors keep abreast of trends and 
issues 
• Board papers could be better quality 
• Board knowledge of topics 
High 
• Effectiveness of investment decisions 
• Do not have a formal process for developing strategy 
• Board-management interface not good High 
• ROAe 
• Director/mgmt interviews Partial 
match 2a 
6 Low 17% High 
• Comprehensive board papers 
High 
• Series of successful acquisitions 
High 
• Outperformed total share 
market 
• Director/mgmt interviews 
No match 
7 Low 12% Low • Poor board papers Low • Poor decision making • Failure to close loss making units Low 
• Loss making 
• Director/mgmt interviews 
Match 
pattern 2b 
  
Table 4:  Expected and observed data patterns for resource dependence theory  
 
Links with Environmenta Access to Resourcesb Performance Case Rating Evidence Rating Evidence Rating Evidencec,d Match 
1 Med 
• Directors with medical careers 
• Director who is financial and business consultant 
• Director involved in property development 
• Director who was formerly in public service 
Med 
• Links to medical community 
• Access to expertise 
• Links to real estate industry 
• Links to government bureaucracy 
Low 
• ROA 
Director/mgmt interviews  No match 
Med 
• Directors with long involvement in retailing 
• Director with legal career 
• Director who is an accountant 
• Owners on board 
Low 
• Links to business community 
• Access to legal advice 
• Access to expertise Med 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews No match 
2 
Med 
•  Directors with long involvement in retailing 
• Director with legal career 
• Director who is an accountant 
• Owners on board 
Low 
• Links to business community 
• Access to legal advice 
• Access to expertise 
 
High 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews No match 
3 Low 
• Director with long involvement with similar 
organisation 
• Director with business consultancy 
• Long involvement with industry 
Low 
• Potential market for company’s product 
• Access to business advice 
 Low 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews Match 
pattern 3a 
4 Med 
• Director head of a government committee and chairman 
of a major company 
• Directors who are executives of parent company 
• Director of an international bank 
Med 
• Access to government and business 
• Access to capital 
• Access to parent company’s financial strength 
and expertise 
Low 
• ROA 
• Director/mgmt interviews No match 
5 Med • 3 members appointed by government Med • Key stakeholder for organisational performance was government High 
• ROAe 
• Director/mgmt interviews  No match 
6 Med 
• Directors identified could be better 
Med 
• Link to government and financial community 
• Respected by market High 
• Outperformed total share 
market 
• Director/mgmt interviews 
No match 
7 Low • Directors have few other board positions • Five directors are farmers Med 
• Poor links to customers and capital Low • Loss making • Director/mgmt interviews 
Partial 
match 3a 
a Classification based on: Low < 33% 
                                         33% < Medium < 66% 
                                         66% < High 
b Classification based on coding – examples of evidence given  
c Classification for ROA based on: Low < 5% 
                                                               5% < Medium < 12% 
                                                              12% < High  
d In all cases the qualitative assessment of firm performance matched the ROA classification 
e Based on Net cash inflow from operating activities/Total assets because government-owned organisation
Expected Patterns Links with Environment Access to Resources Performance 
Pattern 3a Low Low Low 
Pattern 3b High High High 
   
Table 5:  Synopsis of findings – match between expected and observed patterns 
 
Agency Theory Case 
Outsiders Independents
Stewardship 
Theory 
Resource Dependence 
Theory 
1 ○ ● ● ○ 
2 ○/ /○ ○/ ○/○ 
3  ○ ○ ● 
4 ● ● ○ ○ 
5    ○ 
6 ● ● ○ ○ 
7 ○ ○ ●  
    Legend: ● – High Match;  - Partial Match; ○ – No Match 
 
 
